While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued new security standards for nuclear power plants defending against terrorist attacks, residents near these plants are unlikely to even be aware of them. The standards have been developed without the consultation of key groups, and most of the new rules are not being made public. One of the most important pieces of the government’s antiterrorism effort is the “design basis threat,” rules outlining the most likely terrorist attacks that can occur against reactors. Even the non-classified portions of the design basis threat are being kept secret. This level of secrecy removes accountability and scrutiny from an industry that has a poor track for effectively addressing security and safety concerns, which in turn renders their new security standards extremely suspect. The energy industry and government agencies have long been wary of imposing security standards on nuclear plants, deeming them costly and burdensome. Groups such as the Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap have argued for decades that the nuclear industry’s rules addressing attacks were very narrow in scope. In 1985, rules required utilities to prepare only against terrorists using handheld weapons; nothing addressed trucks or planes. After the 1994 World Trade Center bombing, NRC did realize truck bombs posed a threat to security, but any changes in security policies were kept secret. Post September 11th, the glaring need for changes to the design basis threat could not be ignored. However, groups that had long-argued for higher safety measures and consistently pointed out flaws in policy were excluded from the table. This left the decisions up to an industry who consistently fails half of the mock attacks which they set up for themselves, most of the time with notice of the test months in advance. The industry reportedly continues to rely on a false hope that advance warning will be received before an attack. At the same time, they consistently fail to defend against even pre-warned test attacks. Apparently, even today, the industry continues to believe attacks would not likely come from the air. The secrecy of the new security standards allows the nuclear industry to continue to believe they are invulnerable, as the public cannot scrutinize the plans and say otherwise. It prevents outside groups, and communities who are near nuclear facilities from leaning about the vulnerabilities that exist in facilities and what security measures are in place. Without access to this information the industry will remain unaccountable to the public and there can be no push to make the facilities safer and less prone to attack.