The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) understated the risks of mad cow disease and misled the public, according to a bipartisan investigation by the House Government Reform Committee. At issue is whether the cow that recently tested positive for the disease in Washington state was a “downer,” meaning that it was unable to walk. Contrary to the USDA’s contention, three eyewitnesses say that the cow was able to walk and did not appear to be sick at all. This is of critical importance because the USDA bases its testing and surveillance program for mad cow by sampling only downer and other sick animals. USDA officials, including Secretary Ann Veneman, have argued that the discovery of the infected cow is proof that this program is working. However, the House investigation found that this discovery was made only because USDA had an agreement with the plant where the cow was slaughtered to accept samples from nondowner cattle. “If the information we have received is true, a key premise of the USDA [mad cow] testing program is subverted,” wrote Reps. Tom Davis (R-VA), chairman of the Government Reform Committee, and Henry Waxman (D-CA), the ranking Democrat, in a letter to Veneman. “It is self-evident that if the only [infected] cow to be discovered in the United States was able to walk and had no symptoms of central nervous system disease, USDA should not assume that all infected cattle will be either downer cows or cows that exhibit symptoms of central nervous system disease.” This bolsters the case of importers of American beef, including Japan and South Korea, which have argued that USDA’s testing program is insufficient, and should also sample seemingly healthy cows -- something strongly opposed by the beef industry. A USDA advisory body, comprised of foreign experts who have dealt with mad cow, also released a report earlier in the month advising that USDA’s surveillance program “must be significantly extended in order to measure the magnitude of the problem,” and that the agency should strongly consider randomly sampling healthy cattle. Unfortunately, USDA has shown no indication that it is willing to take this step. On the contrary, in the Washington case, Veneman and other USDA officials seemingly ignored information that did not support their predetermined policy. On Jan. 6, 2004, one eyewitness -- the co-manager of the slaughterhouse where the infected cow was discovered -- wrote to USDA warning that the cow was not a downer; however, USDA continued to publicly insist that it was. As a result, wrote Davis and Waxman, “Public confidence in USDA may suffer. Confidence in the food supply requires that the public be able to rely on statements of USDA officials.” The other eyewitnesses cited by Davis and Waxman include the hauler who took the cow to slaughter and the plant employee who killed the cow. The Government Accountability Project brought all three to the attention of the committee.