
Gaps in Homeland Security Benefit Bush Campaign Funders
by Guest Blogger, 10/18/2004
The Bush administration has weakened, opposed, or failed to initiate proposals to address security gaps that leave chemical and nuclear plants, hazardous material carriers, shipping ports, and drinking water facilities vulnerable to terrorist attacks, according to a new report that links these failures to Bush campaign funding from the very industries that oppose needed regulation.
According to the new Public Citizen report Homeland Unsecured: The Bush Administration's Hostility to Regulation and Ties to Industry Leave America Vulnerable, the Bush administration "has abdicated its responsibility to protect the American homeland from the risk of potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks upon chemical plants, nuclear reactors, hazardous materials transport, seaports and water systems."
"In many cases, the administration and its Republican allies in Congress have either opposed security reforms or obstinately refused to act even though ready solutions are obvious," the report maintains.
Five Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
From the Report Homeland Unsecured:
Eight-five percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is controlled by the private
sector. "Homeland security and national preparedness therefore often begins with the private sector," the 9/11 Commission's report says. Security expert Stephen Flynn, director of the Hart-Rudman commission that concluded prior to 9/11 that America's greatest security challenge was the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack, states flatly that "without standards, or even the threat of standards, the private sector will not secure itself."
Yet the administration has failed to use its executive powers or support legislation
to mandate regulatory steps that can and should be taken without large taxpayer expenditures. In some cases, it has played a leading role in blocking critical measures.
This reflects the administration's hostility toward the reasonable regulation of industry, even where the safety and security of Americans is at grave risk. Within days of taking office, the Bush administration began setting up hurdles in the regulatory process and installing industry executives and their allies in the government. A particularly telling appointment was that of John Graham, a well-known industry-backed academic hostile to regulation, who was given the job of regulatory czar within the White House Office of Management and Budget. The administration has hired more than 100 industry lobbyists, lawyers or company executives to fill high-level government jobs during Bush's tenure in office.
While business lobbyists work within the administration to block regulatory initiatives and dismantle existing ones, industries that would be affected by new security measures have lobbied hard against such proposals -- and found much success. And, as this report shows, these same industries have provided strong financial support for the Bush presidential campaigns and the Republican Party.
The chemical, nuclear, hazardous materials transport, ports and shipping, and water utility industries have contributed $19.9 million to Bush and the Republican National Committee since the 2000 election cycle. Thirty of Bush's top fundraisers — 10 so-called "Rangers" and 20 "Pioneers," who each raise at least $200,000 and $100,000, respectively — hail from those industries. In addition, these industries have spent more than $201 million to lobby the administration and Congress since 2002. . . .
The Bush administration and many experts believe that terrorists will attempt to strike again at the United States. Success in thwarting such an attack may well depend on whether the government requires and helps the private sector to adopt strong defenses. Thus far, however, the administration has shunned mandatory protective regulation, legislation and supportive federal funding, professing instead its faith in "voluntary" efforts by industry. Blinded by its anti-regulation ideology and its allegiance to political contributors, the administration has been unwilling to use its executive powers or clout when a Congress led by [its] own party has refused to enact necessary legislation or provide essential funding. This is a tragic mistake that must be confronted if the United States is going to secure our highly vulnerable vital infrastructure against terrorism.
Chemical Plants
Terrorist attacks on any of the nation's 15,000 chemical plants could kill millions. The Army concluded in a 2001 study that an attack on a single plant could kill or injure 2.4 million people, and the Environmental Protection Agency has identified 123 plants that could, in the event of accident or attack, endanger one million people or more.
In fact, terrorists have already entertained these deadly possibilities, according to the report. Evidence from the trial of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers revealed that the terrorists had stolen cyanide from a chemical plant and planned to release it in the WTC ventilation system. The FBI learned that Mohammed Atta, ringleader of the 9/11 attacks, landed a plane in Tennessee in March 2001 and asked a local man what chemicals were contained in the storage tanks he had flown over. Those tanks, it turns out, held more than 250 tons of sulfur dioxide.
Despite the obvious threat, the Bush administration has not begun to secure chemical plant facilities and has in fact opposed measures to require security improvements:
- The administration joined forces with the chemical industry to pressure Congress to reject the Chemical Security Act (S.157), which would have phased out unsafe technologies and required chemical plants to use safer chemicals and technologies when available and feasible.
- The administration scrapped an EPA effort to use its Clean Air Act authority to increase security at chemical plants. The administration "totally overruled EPA's fledgling initiative by allocating responsibility for chemical security to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), even though DHS has no authority to enforce the Clean Air Act or to establish and enforce new plant security standards," the report added.
- DHS has subsequently failed to issue mandatory security regulations. Instead, it has promoted voluntary industry standards, despite its earlier admission in October 2002 that voluntary guidelines are insufficient.
- Security guards failed to protect nuclear power plants nearly half the time in mock terrorist attacks conducted from 1991 to 2001. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has subsequently allowed the nuclear power plants' own lobby to control terrorism preparedness tests, and the lobby has in turn contracted the tests to the same company that provides, in most nuclear facilities, the very security forces that must be tested.
- The NRC proposed in March of this year to weaken, not strengthen, fire safety regulations for nuclear power plants.
- The Government Accountability Office identified three major security flaws that remained unaddressed one year later. Among the flaws: the NRC assesses power plant security plans in an inadequate paper review without on-site visits, and it has no plan to conduct follow-up reviews of plants which the commission has cited for violating security requirements.
