The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to expand the amount of information that can be withheld from the public as Safeguards Information (SGI). The new rule would amend existing SGI regulations to cover more types of information by inserting language and adding a new category of covered information — Safeguards Information-Modified Handling (SGI-M). The SGI category was created under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for “sensitive but unclassified” information. Regulations required protection of information relating to physical protection at fixed nuclear sites; physical protection when in transit; inspections, audits and evaluations; and certain correspondence. For information such as vulnerability data about a facility, the information could be released to the public after the vulnerability was fixed. However, most of the SGI information was only released on a “need-to-know” basis. The new regulations broaden the already expansive SGI regulations with the ability to hide more information. The new proposed SGI exemptions would withhold any information about emergency planning procedures, safety analyses, or defense capabilities. Additionally, NRC inserts language to specifically exempt information about the Design Basis Threat, defined by the agency as “[a] profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary.” NRC has received strong criticism from public interest groups that the agency has not sufficiently utilized the Design Basis Threat mechanism to improve security at nuclear facilities. This provision would effectively silence such criticism and prevent any discussion intent on improving the safety of these dangerous facilities. NRC also proposes the addition of a new sensitive but unclassified designation. The SGI-M designation would allow nuclear materials producers already using the SGI regulations to hide additional types of regulated information. The new category would also extend exemptions to additional manufacturers. Even though NRC estimates that SGI-M data carries a lower risk if released to the general public, the stipulations for access mirror those of SGI information. Similar to SGI, anyone requesting access to SGI-M must demonstrate a “need to know” and must belong to at least one of the prescribed categories, which are almost identical for both safeguards designations. Under the SGI-M provisions almost any data relating to security activities, security forces, or response procedures would be hidden from the public. Communities neighboring nuclear facilities need this type of information to ensure facilities take adequate steps to protect their health and safety. Without this information, the community cannot hold a facility accountable. An environmental group’s effort last year to access security information resulted in a legal dispute after the NRC withheld the information. The group sought information about a facility that intended to waive certain security measures for shipments of nuclear fuel rods, which could have endangered thousands of people. NRC denied access to the information because the agency concluded that the group did not have a “need to know” and because the information was sensitive. A recent Boston Globe story revealed that a shipment of radioactive cargo was lost in transit. Instead of being shipped from Newark to Houston, the shipment was found in Boston. Because the new proposed regulations are so broad and can withhold so much information, it is unclear just how much information NRC would hide under the modified Safeguards Information, and if stories like this one would be censored. NRC’s new sensitive but unclassified category joins similar efforts from other agencies in a growing epidemic of secrecy. Others include Sensitive Homeland Security Information, Sensitive Security Information, and Critical Infrastructure Information.