The Department of Homeland Security's Dangerous Pattern
by Sam Kim, 6/12/2007
On June 5, Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS), chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, wrote an op-ed in The Hill criticizing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the hasty development of ineffective programs. Thompson cites DHS's failed efforts to implement an integrated information-sharing network, but, as he notes, this is merely one of many examples of misplaced priorities and ineffective leadership at DHS. The Department's attempt to build a robust chemical security program could serve as another example.
Thompson accuses DHS of rushing to put in place the information sharing network "without sufficient input from those who would be using it," with the result being a system that does not have the trust of states and other participants and "that fails to meet the needs of its users, [and] duplicates other efforts." Many of the shortcomings of the DHS information sharing network were highlighted in a previous Watcher article "DHS Does Not Share Well with Others."
DHS's efforts to design and implement a chemical security program could easily also fall under Thompson's "haste makes waste" pattern. DHS has taken the authority given by Congress to implement a chemical security program and watered it down to the point that it holds little hope of actually increasing the public's protection from accidents or attacks on chemical plants.
The regulations are weak in three respects. First, DHS maintains the right to preempt stronger state chemical security regulations. This could be severely detrimental to the effort of states to protect their citizens against chemical facility accidents or attacks. Second, the program is highly secretive. What facilities are covered by the regulations, what facilities are failing to comply with the regulations and what sorts of specific improvements are being made by facilities can all be kept secret from the public. Third, DHS rejected the proposal to require companies to report on safer chemicals, procedures or technologies that could be implemented to reduce a facility's risk. Not requiring companies to even consider making such changes reduces the possibility that they will actually be made. These weaknesses were included in DHS's regulations despite numerous comments pointing out the problems these provisions would cause in creating an effective protection program.
As a result of these shortcomings, public interest and environmental groups have encouraged the chairs of the key committees — Reps. Thompson and Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) — to force DHS to devote the necessary time and effort to implement an effective and robust chemical security program. Any delay in DHS's action leaves millions of Americans at constant risk of a dangerous chemical accident or attack.