Congress Can Shape War Policy through Appropriations Process

President Bush's plan to increase troop levels in Iraq has stirred up debate recently over the extent to which Congress can direct war policy. While some have gone so far as to suggest that Congress has the authority to do no more than make symbolic statements, in truth, the appropriations process gives Congress significant — albeit restricted — power to shape the course of war policy. Using the Power of the Purse One of Congress's strongest tools for guiding war policy stems from the "power of the purse," which gives Congress the power to introduce legislation allocating funding for federal programs and policies. Fundamentally, this power means that Congress has a strong hand in approving or denying funding to implement military policy. Current military action is being funded through the appropriations process. As such, Congress allocates a certain amount of money to be spent on the war effort in a given fiscal year. When the military runs out of that money, it must ask Congress for another appropriation, at which point Congress gets a new opportunity to "turn on" or "turn off" funding for the war effort. The power to "turn off" funding for military policy can be applied either bluntly or precisely. Congress can turn off funding entirely by deciding not to pass any funding for the war at all. Alternatively, it can turn off funding within an appropriations bill for certain purposes or timeframes. These restrictions are phrased negatively and are explicitly geared to restrict the funds for certain uses (i.e., funding in this account shall not be used for this specific purpose...). The same principle applies for "turning on" funding. Congress can pass an appropriations bill that provides a lump-sum of funding with no directions. Or, within an appropriations bill, Congress can proactively direct funding for an express purpose or timeframe. It can mandate that a specific amount of money be used for a specific purpose only. Or it can condition funding allocation on some other event or benchmark being met. If any type of guiding language is included in the text of the legislation, it carries the force of law and is binding on the president. If it is included in report language that accompanies the bill, it is not binding. Restrictions on Purse-Power The power of the purse is not unlimited. First and foremost, an appropriations bill is subject to a point of order if it "legislates." Legislating on appropriations means the appropriations bill limits, directs or conditions funding in a way that does not comport with enacted authorizations, which enable or create government policy but often do not fund them. The Congressional Research Service summarizes this restriction:
    Under Senate and House rules, limitations, as well as other language in the text of appropriations legislation, cannot change existing law (paragraphs 2 and 4 of Senate Rule XVI and clause 2(b) and (c) of House Rule XXI). That is, they cannot amend or repeal existing law nor create new law (referred to as legislation or legislation on an appropriations bill). Limitations also may not extend beyond the fiscal year for which an appropriation is provided.
In other words, Congress must waive a point of order, provided one is raised, to turn on funding for policies that are not already written into law. When this happens, it is what's known as an "unauthorized appropriation." In addition, appropriations bills that change the terms of enacted authorizations are subject to points of order. This obstacle is not as restrictive as it may appear. Points of order are not self-enforcing, as a member must raise a point of order for it to take effect. In the House, points of order can be waived by special order of the Rules Committee. In the Senate, a 3/5ths majority is necessary for a waiver. And this point of order has limited application. It does not apply to limitations that proscribe or prescribe funding certain activities, unless they amend, repeal or enact authorizing legislation, or require the enactment of a separate authorization. What's more, there is ample evidence of unauthorized appropriations surviving year after year. The Congressional Budget Office produces a report each year itemizing unauthorized appropriations that continue to pass each year. Therefore, the point of order must be waived from time to time, or not raised at all. Yet there are other ways this power is limited, such as through the presidential veto. Just like any other bill, appropriations bills are vulnerable to a possible veto, which can be overturned only by a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate. Further, the president could also choose to not comply with directives included in an appropriations bill. Someone must then enter litigation to force presidential compliance. If such a dispute were to enter the courts, Congress's authority would likely be affirmed. Many constitutional law experts have asserted Congress has the constitutional authority to construct rules that guide military affairs. Opportunities to Influence Policy So when can Congress use this power? Three opportunities will soon present themselves: the extension of the FY 2007 Continuing Resolution in late January or early February, the enactment of the FY 2007 supplemental war appropriations request expected in February, and the enactment of FY 2008 Department of Defense appropriations bill later in 2007. All of these legislative vehicles will send funding to the war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and all can be amended should Congress so choose. Congressional prerogative over war policy in appropriations bills would have precedents as well. The Center for American Progress has compiled an expansive list of examples where Congress has shaped war and foreign policy through the appropriations process. Thus, if Congress wants to make binding changes in war policy, the appropriations process affords ample opportunity.
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