The White House issued an executive order (E.O. 13450) on Nov. 13 that would attempt to entrench the administration's controversial Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) within federal agencies long after President Bush leaves the White House. The order would create a point person within agencies responsible for program performance, allow the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) more leverage over specific aspects of program implementation and solidify the PART program review process as the evaluator of government programs. The PART mechanism has significant limitations to thorough and unbiased program evaluation, introducing biases and a skewed ideological perspective into a model claiming to present consistent and objective performance data and evaluations of government programs. Oftentimes, the PART actually decreases the efficiency and effectiveness of government through increased administrative burdens, distracted managers and compliance costs. This somewhat redundant executive order re-emphasizes the need for agency staff and programs to "spend taxpayer dollars effectively and more effectively each year," and requires agency heads to establish clear annual and long-term goals that can be assessed by "objectively measured outcomes." Agency heads are also required to develop specific plans for achieving program goals and the means to measure program progress toward those goals. All of these requirements, in some form, are present in a previous government performance initiative, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and on the surface are worthwhile and commendable goals. Reaction to the order from public management experts was somewhat quizzical (see this Washington Post article), as many thought the order failed to break new ground — repeating many of the requirements agencies already operate under in the GPRA law. An anonymous source at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency told Inside the EPA this order was unlikely to "result in major changes in agency practice" because agencies already follow most of the requirements contained within the order. Others were surprised at the timing of the order, coming late in tenure of this administration. OMB has stated it would like to have the E.O. fully implemented by September 2008, just four months before the end of the Bush presidency. The timing has led many to conclude this is an attempt to extend the influence of the Bush administration's performance management initiative. Clay Johnson, the deputy director for management at OMB, confirmed that objective. "There should be no dropped batons going from this administration to the next administration," he told the Washington Post. "The next administration will come in knowing what every department is committed to do. It will help ensure there is continuous attention to these goals." The crucial aspect in this executive order that attempts to extend influence is the requirement that the heads of agencies — including all government corporations and sponsored entities (i.e., Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Fannie Mae) and all independent agencies (i.e., Federal Communications Commission, Federal Election Commission) — appoint a senior executive to serve as a "performance improvement officer" to oversee all performance management activities of the agency, including development of strategic plans, annual performance goals, and performance reports. These performance improvement officers would also be required to advise the head of agencies as to the sufficient aggressiveness of program goals and realistic chances of achieving those goals given resource constraints. This structure, in and of itself, is not a terrible proposal. A more formalized, streamlined, and hopefully accountable structure within each federal agency that reports to the agency head (and not OMB) that would focus on improving program performance and spending money wisely is certainly needed. This structure may even help to make strategic plans developed under GPRA more tangible within agencies and create an atmosphere that boosts staff productivity and morale. Unfortunately, these results are not guaranteed by the structure of the proposal, and using current Bush administration performance management tools, particularly the PART, would seriously damage the ability to develop objective and reliable program evaluations and recommendations. Further decreasing the potential of this proposal, the executive order creates a narrowly-populated "performance improvement council," consisting of the Deputy Director of Management at OMB, who would act as the chair of the council, a selection of performance improvement officers, and other full or part-time agency staff as determined by the chair of the council and relevant agency heads. This council would, among other duties, submit to the director of OMB current or proposed performance management policies and criteria for evaluation of program performance, as well as update the director or the president on the progress of performance improvement across the government. While the E.O. states the program improvement officers are responsible to agency heads, the structure of this council cuts out agency heads and has the potential to be the conduit for infusion of political directives and biases into program operations. On the whole, this executive order continues the Bush administration focus on narrow, White House-centered performance evaluation. This is significantly different from GPRA, which was supposed to be agency-driven in creating long-term goals, developed in consultation with outside stakeholders and Congress. It is likely Congress will meet this executive order with as much skepticism as they give to the PART. In a recent attempt to increase the relevance of PART in Congress, an amendment offered by Sen. Wayne Allard (R-CO) was soundly defeated 68-21. Because the performance improvement council consists of high-level OMB staff and senior executives, both of whom are unlikely to have extensive programmatic experience in the programs they are to evaluate, this order is sure to make PART the de facto metric for determining program performance. It is possible the performance improvement officers will create another window through which OMB and the White House can attempt to control specifics of program policies and implementation within the agencies. Even worse, this structure further separates career agency and OMB personnel from the very performance accountability standards the administration has attempted to impose. Appointing an agency representative who oversees all performance evaluation and reports directly to the head of the agency and high-level OMB staff, but who will likely have little to no experience with specific programs they are supposed to be evaluating, will exacerbate the severe limitations of the PART. The E.O. also leaves open some issues. Will the process described in the E.O. be an add-on to the existing PART process? How will the requirements of the E.O. be reconciled with legislative requirements under GPRA? Will this add more paperwork requirements for agency staff? These types of questions will need to be answered before the civil service staff embrace the intent of the E.O. Despite the limitations of this executive order, OMB has continued its commitment to increasing transparency and access to government information. This order requires agency websites to contain regularly updated and accurate information on program performance in a useable and searchable form and makes an effort to make agency Inspector General reports more accessible on the web. This requirement builds upon many improvements OMB has made to its ExpectMore.gov website, which displays the PART review information for all programs. Unfortunately, this commitment to transparency is not enough to make up for the fact that the information being provided is of limited value.